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CAMPUS NOTES.

CLASS NOTES.'

THE FoRUM extends the sympathy of
the students of the Law School to Prof. J.
M. Weakley il his recent bereavement.

Flynn, '04, spent Jan. 23-30th in Reynoldsville, being called there on account
of the death of his grandmother.

The third of a series of six informal
dances was held by the Comus Club, in
Armory Hall, Saturday evening, February
6th. The dance was highly successful.
The Year Book of Dickinson College,
comprising Dickinson Preparatory School,
Dickinson College, and Dickinson School
of Law, has just been issued. It consists
of 142 pages, and is a very artistic catalogue.

Yocum, '04, was initiated into the Carlisle Lodge of Elks Tuesday evening, Feb.
2nd. Rumor has it that, during the progress of the initiation, he was "'scalped."
Lanard, '04, Wilcox, '04, Hubler, '04,
Henneke, '05, and Jack, '06, attended the
reception at Wilson College Tuesday evening, Feb. 2nd.

_

Several students of the Law School have
accepted positions with the Pittsburg
Aluminum Company for the Summer vacation.
The Law School Basketball Team was
defeated by the York Basketball Team,
Friday evening, Feb. 5th, by the score of

Reno, '05, returned to his home, in Allentown, on account of illness.

30 to 5.

Jos. E. Oyer, '05, was initiated into
Delta Chi Friday evening, Jan. 29th.

The first of a series of lectures given by
Prof. J. Al. Weakley was held Friday
evening, Feb. 5th, in the main recitation
room of the Law School. His subject was,
"Justices of the Peace in Pennsylvania."

Park, '05, will not return to the Law
School this year.
FRATERNITY NOTES.

The Delta Chi Fraternity had their annual group picture taken Saturday afternoon, Jan. 30th.
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The Theta Lambda Phi Fraternity tendered an informal reception to the Wilson
College girls, who were in town Saturday,
Jan. 23d, for the purpose of attending the
Comus Club dance that evening.

Albert T. Morgan, '01, is practicing law
at Washington, Pa.

ALUMNI NOTES.

Berton B. Barr, '01, is practicing law at
Washington, Pa.

Francis J. Weakley, '95, died of pneumonia at Scranton Jan. 22nd, and was
buried in Carlisle Jan. 25th. He was a
son of Prof. J. M. Weakley, of the Law
School.
Geo. B. Somerville, '97, is practicing
law, and is the President of the Lake
Trade Coal Co., at Windber, Pa.
Thomas K. Leidy, '97, is Assistant District Attorney in Reading, Pa.
Albert I. Livingston, '97, is a journalist
at Santa Fe, New Mexico.
Isaac Wingert, '97, and wife, of Chambersburg. visited Carlisle friends Feb. 4th.
Harry W. Savidge, '97, was elected one
of the Democratic State delegates from
Northumberland county.
Clarence Raymond Gilliland, '98, is an
electrical engineer with the Westinghouse
Electric and Manufacturing Co., at East
Pittsburg, Pa.
Fred. B. Moser, '98, is practicing law at
Shamokin, Pa., being a member of the
firm of Lark & Moser. He is a candidate
for the Republican nomination for District
Attorney of Northumberland county.

L. R. Holcomb, '01, has law offices at
Wilkesbarre, Pa. He was a member of the
last Legislature of Pennsylvania.

John Kemp, '01, is building up a lucrative practice at Hazleton, Pa.
Robert Holden Moon, '02, was married
on Jan. 6th to Miss Amy Lowry Hutchinson, at Parkersburg, W. Va.
E. B. Williamson, '03, was admitted to
the York County Bar Jan. 19th, and has
successfully passed the Supreme Court examination.
Thos. B. Wilson, '03, an attorney of
Bradford, Pa., took a business trip to the
Pacific Coast during December and January.
H. A. Gross, '03, was admitted to the
York County Bar Jan. 19th, and has successfully.passed theSupreme Court examination.
Albert S. Longbottom, '03, of Philadelphia, recently suffered a slight attack of
pneumonia.
Jas. J. Logan, ex-'04, spent Jan. 29th in
town.
Walter P. Bishop, '03, and Albert S.
Longbottom, '03, have succeeded in passing the Supreme Court examination.
ANNUAL PRIZES.

Harry P. Conley, '98, is located in Shamokin, being associated with his father
and brother in the firm of J. H. Couley &
Sons, hardware merchants.
Gabriel H. Moyer, '98, is a member of
the law firm of Siegrist & Moyer, doing
business at Lebanon, Pa.
John 0. Miller, '99, is practicing law at
York, Pa., and is attorney for the YorkCoalinga Oil Co.
J. Wilmer Fisher, '99, is practicing law
at Reading, Pa.
H. Franklin Kantner, '99, is practicing
law at Reading, Pa.

The Wrn. D. Boyer Prize, No. 1, of $25,
will be given to the member of the Junior
class that does the best work in Contracts.
The Win. D. Boyer Prize, No. 2, of $25,
will be given to such member of the Middle class as does the best work in Evidence.
The 1st Dean's Prize will be awarded to
the member of the Senior class that shall
have done the best work in Constitutional
Law.
The 2nd Dean's Prize will be awarded
to the Junior who does the best work in
the law of Real Property.
The Win. C. Allison Prize will be given
to the Middler that does the best work in
the law of Decedents' Estates.
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MOOT COURT.
JNO. WILSON vs. SARAH BRAITHWAITE.
Surrender of deed-The surrender of a
deed upon consideration estops grantee
from further assertion of title-Attornment of tenant to landlordnormallyprecludeslenantfrom denying title Qf landlord-Taking deedfrom privatepapers
of grantee after his death is no delivery
andpasses no title; there must be actual
delivery, with intention to deliver, and
grantormust be alive-Mfarriedwomen
-Size can only divest herinterest in land
in manner provided by statute-She is
not estopped by acts which estop afeme
sole-Equityfollows the law.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Wilson conveyed, for $2,000, a house to
Sarah Teller, wife of John Teller, and the
Tellers took possession. Six months later
Sarah Teller became dissatisfied with the
bargain, and, at the instance of John,
begged Wilson to return the money and
accept the deed. Wilson repaid the money
and received back his deed, and the Tellers
continued as tenants in the house, paying
$100 yearly rent. Two years later Wilson
died, and Sarah Teller (his sister), finding
the deed undestroyed, took it. The son
of Wilson brings this ejectment against
his aunt, who, Teller having died, has become the wife of Samuel Braithwaite.
JONES for plaintiff.
A parol assignment of a deed is legal.
Barnwid v. Kuhn, 36 Pa. 390. There is
no presumption of delivery of a deed where
grantee holds under suspicious circumstances. Rine v. Robinson, 27 Pa. 30;
Cable v. Cable, 146 Pa. 451. There can be
no delivery after death of grantor. Shoenberger v. Zook, 34 Pa. 24; Durand's Appeal, 116 Pa. 93. The attornment of the
tenant estops the tenant from setting up
title against the landlord.
EHLER for defendant.

A surrender cannot be made in this informal way. It requires a formal conveyance recognized by law. Tiedeman on
Real Property, 741. Re-delivery of an
unrecorded deed by grantee to grantor is
ineffectual for purpose of revesting title.
Botsford v. Morehouse et al., 4 Conn. 550 ;
Starr v. Starr, 1 Ohio 221 ; Jackson v.
Chase, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 84; Rogers v.
Rogers, 53 Wis. 86. The decisions against
the general rule are based on the rule of
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evidence, that grantee will not be permitted to introduce parol evidence to establish contents of deed where he destroys
the primary evidence. Lawrence v. Stratten, 6 Cush. 103 ; Raynor v. Wilson, 6 Hill
(N. Y.) 469; Wiley v. Christ, 4 Watts,
199. Here deed was not destroyed ; there is
no necessity to introduce secondary proof.
Plaintiff must recover on the strength of
his own title.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Counsel for defendant contends that recovery by the plaintiff must be on the
strength of his own title. Then arises the
question, "Did any right or title descend
to the son of Wilson in the premises in dispute ?" Before determining this, it muat
be decided whether or not the parol reconveyance of the property was valid. If it
was, the son of Wilson received the title
sufficient to recover on its strength.
Generally a parol contract for the sale of
land is void at law. In actions of ejectment, though, which are substitutes for
bills in equity, the plaintiff can recover on
such a contract if he shows by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence, sufficient to satisfy fully the conscience of a
Chancellor, a contract complete in its,
terms, and such a performance or partial
performance, including a taking possession
in pursuance of the contract as would
make it unjust and inequitable not to execute the contract. 120 Pa. 49. Its equity
must be apparent, involving no doubt, and
wanting in no requisites necessary to move
the conscience. 120 Pa. 138. This case
falls within the rule thus laid down, and
fully answers its requirements.
The contract was complete in its terms,
as it appears that John Teller, for his wife,
made an offer to Wilson to return the deed
if the grantor should repay the purchase
money, and Wilson accepted the offer by
handing it back for the deed in dispute.
The performance of the contract as respects the taking of possession was sufficient. Mrs. Teller, for two years after the
reconveyance, paid rent to Wilson, thus
acknowledging a superior title in him to
the occupied premises. The relations of
landlord and tenant were fully established.
The possession of a tenant is the possession
of his landlord, and when the relation is
once established it cannot be destroyed
during the occupancy of the tenant, without express notice to the landlord that the
tenant holds adversely. 18 Superior 245.
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No evidence is shown to support a preentered upon the verdict for plaintiff for
sumption that the tenant held adversely,
the property described in the writ of ejectexcept the possession of the deed by Sarah
ment.
Braithwaite after the death of Wilson.
GEORGE E. WOLFE, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
In the absence of suspicious circumstances,
her possession of it would beprimafacie
The situation before us is briefly this:
evidence of its delivery to her. But this
A sale of real estate is consummated ; the
grantee goes into possession, and continues
case is not free from such circumstances.
undisputed owner for six months. The
Mrs. Teller became dissatisfied with the
parties then, by mutual consent, attempt
bargain, and, at her intercession, the
grantor rescinded the contract and placed
a parol rescission of the executed sale by a
her whereshe desired to be. She was satreturn of the deed and the money. The
isfied, and paid rent for two years thereaf- grantee has since recognized the title of
ter, until, by a discovery on her part, she
her grantor by paying him rent as landregained possession of the deed and then
lord. The grantee now sets up her title,
attempted to hold adversely to the heir at
and reinforces her claim with the old deed,
law, the son of Wilson. Such actions are which she has found among the papers of
extremely suspicious, and, the plaintiff her grantor. The heir of the grantee
having proved them so, destroys the prebrings ejectment. The situation is complicated by the fact that the grantee was
sumption that the possession of the deed
by defendant was the result of its delivery
afeme covert when the rescission was atto her, therefore, its possession could not
tempted, and is so now, though with a
be evidence that Mrs. Braithwaite gave
different husband.
Wilson express notice that she held adIn the first place, it is clear that the
versely as landlord. No other means of
present defendant was atone timeabsolute
express notice was alleged by the defendowner of the property in dispute, and that
ant, but on the contrary, she, by the payshe continued such for the space of six
ment of rent, expressly recognized the remonths. At this date the parties manilationship of landlord and tenant.
fested by their actions a clear intentio.i to
resume their original positions. The plainThe plaintiff in ejectmeut must recover
on the strength of his own title, either as
tiff contends that the law should enforce
beiig good against all the world, or as bethis intention. The defendant replies that
ing good as against the defendant by estopa title once vested can only be divested by
pel. This rifle must be limited, and exa deed executed in the statutory mode.
plained by the nature of each case as it
It is probably safe to state that the averarises. 18 L. R. A. 781.
age man, uninitiated into the intricacies
The plaintiff has shown that the parol
of the law, would infer that the return of
assignment to his father was valid, and,
the instrument of conveyance to a grantor
therefore ht right to the premises and his
would be as effective to carry back to him
right of possession necessary to support
the title as the tradition to the grantee
this action of ejectment. The defendant
had been effective in transferring it in the
is estopped from showing the strength of
first instance. The number of cases in the
her title by the fact of the suspicious cirbooks involving this situation indicates
cum. atxesattending her possession of the
the prevalence of the impression, so that,
deed. To permit her to hold the property
unless some ground for creating an excepagainst the plaintiff would be an approval
tion to the above rule can be found, situaof attempted fraud against the heir at law.
tions like the present will present a reThe return of the deed, and the retaking
curring spectacle of fraud unredressed.
of the purchase money, followed by the
A case involving hardships, in which
subsequent action of the parties, estopped
the rule was enforced, is found in Botsford
the grantee and her heirs from invoking
v. Morehouse et al., 4 Conn. 550. Some
the aid of the deed then in her possession.
time after the parties had returned the deed
3 Pennypacker 199.
and the consideration, the creditors of the
The conclusion is, that Wilson, the heir
grantee levied an execution on the land,
at law, has shown a valid legal title to the
and then recovered it in an ejectment
disputed premises; therefore, judgment
against the grantor. This decision is fol-
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lowed in 5 Conn. 86, and 5 Conn. 262. In
Wilson v. Still, 13 N. J. Eq. 143, a female
grantee returned the deed to her grantor,
requesting that lie make a new one, naming her husband as grantee. This was
done, but it was held, after the wife's
death, that the means adopted had been
inadequate for the accomplishment of their
purpose. That the mere return and canrellation of the deed at the instance of the
grantee will not effect a revesting of the
title in the grantor, is decided in a long
line of cases. See Raynor v. Wilson, 6
TiM 472; Marshall v. Fisk, 6 Mass. 32;
Chessman v. Wittemore, 23 Pick. 234;
Jackson v. Anderson, 4 Wend. 482.
The cases in which the courts have hesitated have been those in which a grantee,
fi~lding himself unable to pay the purchase
money, has found someone who has agreed
to take the bargain off his hands. The
grantee is relieved from further liability
upon his surrender of his deed and the
grantor 'makes a new deed to the new
grantee. To forbid the first grantee to
later attack the title of the second grantee,
whom he has watched paying out his
money for a deed for land whose title the
first grantee knew was in himself, is but
to apply the equitable doctrine of estoppel
in pais. A number of cases rest on this
ground. See Com. v. Dudley, 10 Mass.
403; Holbrook v. Tirrell, 9 Pick. 105;
Lawrence v. Stratton, 6 Cush. 163; Tomson v. Ward, 1 N. H. 9; Gardner v.
McFallen, 79 Pa. 398.
In New Hampshire the cases go still
further. In Farras v. Farras, 4 N. H. 9,
while it is conceded that the title is not
strictly revested, yet, it is said, "the
grantee having voluntarily, and without
any misapprehension or mistake, consented to the destruction of the deed, with
a view to revest the title, he is not to be
permitted to show the contents of the deed
by parol evidence. So that, there being
no competent evidence that the land ever
passed, the title is to be considered as having always remained in the grantor." In
the case at bar, however, the defendant
comes armed with the deed.
Later New Hampshire cases discard the
evidence element in its rule, and say flatly
that "the redelivery, by a grantee to his
grantor, of an,unrecorded deed, with the
intention and express purpose of having it
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caucelled, and of revesting the title in the
premises therein described, in the grantor,
hasprecisel.ythe effect intended, upon the
principle of estoppel." Dodge v. Dodge,
33 N. H. 487 ; Mussey v. Holt, 24 N. H.
248; S. C. 55 Am. Dec. 234.
In Wiley v. Christ, 4 W. 196, though the
question was not in dispute, the court took
the position, that by the surrender of the
deed for destruction the grantee becomes
the trustee for his grantor. He firsttakes
the narrower ground that the grantee has
precluded himself from using parol evidence of the deed's contents, but later takes
the broad ground that "in equity and good
conscience the grantee is precluded from
settingup and claimingunder a deed which
he had voluntarily destroyed, and for the
doing of which he had received a consideration equal to the value of the estate."
This position has been recently taken in
Clones v. Clones, 22 Pa. Superior Ct. 339.
In Bane et al. v. Sutton, 3 Penny. 199, the
grantee continued in possession, and paid
rent to her quondam grantor, and the
court recognized the doctrine urged by the
counsel for the plaintiff in the present
case, that this fact added force to the estoppel.
Tie idea that the Statute of Frauds is an
obstacle to a recovery has been adequately
answered by the learned court below. The
plaintiff does not show a contract to convey, but an attempt to convey. But, certainly, the greater includes the less. The
grantor has resumed possession through a
tenant (the grantee), and the entire consideration for the reconveyance has been
paid. Such facts would justify a decree of
specific performance, and the question of
inproyements is of no importance. Brown
et al. v. Bailey et al., 159 Pa. 121 ; Miller
v. Zufall, ll Pa. 323.
As has been suggested, the dotrine of
estoppel has a double application to the
present defendant. Aside from the voluntary surrender of the deed, she has recognized the plaintiff's title by paying rent
for two years to his ancestor. This fact
alone will normally preclude a tenant from
showing that his landlord had no title at
the time the lease was granted. It is,
however, a recognized exception, that
when, by mistake, a tenant has really
taken a lease of his own land, this fact may
be shown (Taylor on Landlord and Ten-
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ant, sec. 89), or that he has acquired the
very title under which the lessor claims.
Elliott v. Smith, 23 Pa. 131.
The defendant will hardly contend that
the mere possession of a deed by her, in
which she is the grantee and the father of
the plaintiff the grantor, will confer on
her the title. The delivery of a deed is an
essential part of its execution, and the existence of the grantor, and his intent to
transfer title, are essential parts of the delivery. Taking the deed from among the
private papers of the grantor after his death
can, therefore, pass no title. Critchfield
v. Critchfield, 24 Pa. 100.
We now reach the question, "Does the
fact that the defendant was and is a married woman protect her?" It is true that
the doctrine of estoppel has been invoked
against a married woman in matters as to
which she is not under disability. It has
been said that "a married woman, in her
dealings with the world, should be held to
the observance of the same good faith to
which others are bound; the protection
against liability upon contracts, which her
coverture affords, is for the prevention of
fraud, and she should not thereby be enabled, with impunity, to defraud others."
Grim's Appeal, 105 Pa. 382; Bucknor's
Estate, 136 Pa. 23. The defendant should
have made a deed. Her husband should
have joined with her, and she should have
acknowledged it. As she has not done so,
we may ask, "Does equity require us to
consider that as done which ought to have
been done?"
In Glidden v. Struples, 52 Pa, 400, and
a long line of cases following it, it has been
emphatically decided that a married
woman's interest in land cannot be divested except in the manner pointed out
by the statute, and she can not be estopped
by acts or declarations which, in the case
of a feme sole, would operate as an estoppel. The hardship involved in Glidden v.
Struples was intense, yet it was emphatically held that IIin regard to powers that
are in their nature statutable, equity must
follow the law, be the consideration ever
so meritorious. Otherwise, equity would
defeat the very policy of the legislative
enactments."
In the case at bar it is said that "Sarah,
at the instance of John, begged Wilson to
return the money," etc. But it has been

repeatedly decided that the only way his
consent can be shown is by his joinder in
her deed. Trimmer v. Heagy, 16 Pa. 484.
If married women may recover in ejectment lands which they have conveyed by
a deed deficient only in the husband's
joinder, how can the delivery of that which
does not even purport to be her deed be
more efficacious ? Her receipt and use of
the consideration is no bar to her recovery,
nor any ground for the interposition of
equity. Richards v. McClelland, 29 Pa.
385. Even had the plaintiff's father gone
into possession in person, and have made
valuable improvements, the position of the
defendant would still be invulnerable.
Crest v. Jack, 3 Watts 238 ; Carr v. Wallace, 7 Watts 394; Rogers v. Walker, 6
Pa. 374. The facts were fully in the possession of both parties, and a mistake as to
their legal effect is no ground for equitable
relief. McAnich v. Laughlin, 13 Pa. 371.
We must conclude, therefore, that, while
the plaintiff might have recovered had the
defendant been single, or a male, her coverture enables her to commit this palpable
fraud. The only cases which aid the plaintiff rest on the doctrine of estoppel, and a
married woman cannot be estopped out of
her land. Further, Mr. Braithwaite has
not been heard from. His interest has
attached, and we do not know that he will
consent to join in a deed from the defendant, even if she were personally bound to
make one. We do not attempt to reconcile the conclusion of Judge Orlady in
Clones v. Clones, 22 Super. Ct. 395.
Thej udgment for the plaintiffis reversed.
BOROUGH OF EASTON vs.
MCALLISTER.
Properform of action-Liability ofproperty owner for injury to pedestrians
caused by excavating the streetsWhether such negligence can be imputed
to the borough.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

The borough permitted McAllister to
excavate its streets, to put down a private
sewer, on his promising to indemnify it
against liability from accidents resulting
from the excavation, etc. A pedestrian
fell into the unguarded excavation, was
hurt, and obtained ajudgment against the
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borough for $1,000. This is trespass against
McAllister to recover the indemnity. Defendant objects (1), the contract was
against public policy; (2), the action of
trespass is not appropriate.
JONE S for the plaintiff.
The borough can recover from McAllister, the author of the negligence, and the
formerj udgment is evidence of the amount
of the damages. Richiston v. Montgomery, 79 N. Y. 6.5; Robbins v. Chicago, 4
Wall. 657; Village of Port Jarvis v. Bank,
96 N. Y. 550; Trickett on Borough Law,
498.
This action of trespass is appropriate.
Brookville v. Arthurs, 130 Pa. 501; Borough v. Warne, 106 Pa. 373; Wilt v.
Welsh, 6 Watts 9; Pittsburg v. Grier, 22
Pa. 54.
S EiqcER for the defendant.
The borough and defen'dant were joint
trespassers, and, therefore, would bejointly
liable. There is no contribution as between joint tort feasors. Armstrong Co.
v. Clarion Co., 66 Pa. 218; Boyer v. Bolander, 129 Pa. 329.
If a contract existed between the borough
and McAllister, the action should be excontractu, that is, assumpsit. Clark on
Contracts; Boyer v. Bolander, 129 Pa.
324.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The Act of May 16, 1891 (P. & L. 4219),
gives every municipal corporation authority to lay out sewers and drains in any
street or alley. This, we think, refers to
the construction of public sewers, in which
case, in order to authorize the construction of the same by the borough, the borough council must first pass an ordinance
authorizing such construction. A resolution to construct such public sewer will
not do. Strohli v. Borough of Ephrata,
178 Pa. 50 ; Riebe v. Borough of Lansford,
18 Pa. C. C. R. 289.
This we believe to be the law concerning
a publicsewer. But the statement of facts
before us reads: "The borough 'permitted'
McAllister to excavate its streets and put
down a private sewer." Must the borough
also pass an ordinance to do this? Or will
a resolution do? Or shall we understand
to mean that an
the word "permitted"
ordinance was passed authorizing the
same? We do not think it will admit of
any such construction. Then can a resolution give such permission, and still he a
valid contract, this being a sewer?
In cases of necessity, the authorities of
a borough may license private individuals
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to occupy public highways to a reasonable
extent for private purposes. Smith v. Simons, 103 Pa. 32.
A private sewer, like a private drain,
(Smith v. Simons, siipra) is not of such
public importance as to necessitate the
passing of an ordinance in order to make
it a valid contract, and we therefore think
a resolution in this case would be sufficient
to make the contract valid.
This being so, the next question presented for our consideration is, is trespass
the proper action, or must the action be
brought in assumpsit?
An obligation may arise from an agreement or froma tort. When the obligation
or duty is fixed or arisesby agreement, the
action is ex-contractu. But the obligation
is not always fixed by the parties. It may
be supplied by a custom, or by the law
itself; and where the obligation is so supplied, and there is a violation, such violation may make a case of tort or a breach
of contract, at the election of the party injured. Bigelow on Torts, 26; Bank of
Orange v. Brown, 3 Wend. 158. Was this
obligation then and its breach such as was
supplied by custom or law? If so, the action in trespass will lie; if not, the action
must be in assumpsit.
Here McAllister agreed to indemnify the
borough against liability for accidents resulting from the excavation. His obligation to it arose from the terms of their
agreement, and not by the breach of any
custom, warranty or law.
We, therefore, think the action should
have been in assumpsit; and further, we
do not think the borough can recover from
McAllister, even if trespass be admitted to
be the proper action, because we believe
they were joint tortfeasors,and therefore,
the one wrongdoer cannot enforce contribution from the other. Boyer v. Bolander,
129 Pa. 324; Armstrong Co. v. Clarion Co.,
66 Pa. 218. For these reasons we feel justified in non-suiting the plaintiff.
Fox, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The borough permitted McAllister to
excavate the street for the purpose of putting down a sewer. This was no authority
to him to neglect the precautions needful
to prevent pedestrians from falling into the
ditch. By omitting these precautions he
became liable to those who suffered damage in consequence.
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His omission is not imputable to the
borough. Owing tothe users of the streets
an oversight over them, its negligence
would consist, not in the omissions of
McAllister, but in its failure to discover
them and to adopt means to avoid the results of them. He and it are not joint
tortfeasors. The fact that each of them
was negligent, and that the injury to the
pedestrian would have been prevented had
either been careful, does not make both of
them jointly guilty. There is, therefore,
no reason why the borough, being compelled to indemnify the pedestrian, may
not in turn receive reimbursement from
McAllister. Brookville v. Arthurs, 130
Pa. 501 ; 152 Pa. 334 ; Phila. Co. v. Traction Co., 165 Pa. 456; Reading City v.
Reiner, 167 Pa. 41.
As the law does not prohibit the borough
from obtaining an indemnity, it does not
refuse validity to a contract for such indemnity. There is no doubt that a suit
can be maintained upon the McAllister
contract. But, such is the relation of both,
that McAllister's act has obliged the borough to incur the alternative of expense
and labor to neutralize his negligence, or
of compensation to the injured pedestrian.
This is a wrong, of a tortious nature, redress for which can be obtained by an action of trespass. We doubt not that the
borough could have maintained assumpsit,
but wesee no reason for compelling it to
sue on the contract rather than on the
tort. For these reasons the judgment of
the learned court below must be reversed,
with v.f. d. n.

JOHN McCABE vs. PA. R. R. CO.
Negligence - Contributory neliqence Negligence qf carrier not imputable to
passenqer-Jointtortfeaso's.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

McCabe was being carried to a station
by the defendant, and was let off at the
station. McCabe and other passengers
mounted an omnibus to be driven into the
town. The street on which it was running crossed the track, and the train was
about commencing to move. The driver
of the omnibussaw the train, although it
did not ring or whistle; but believing he
could cross, urged his horses over the

track. The locomotive struck the hind
wheel of the omnibus, oversetting it. The
train usually stopped long enough to allow
the omnibus to cross the track before it
(the train) began to move. For some
reason it started one-half minute earlier
than usual. McCabe, a passenger, sues for
injuries arising from the overturning of the
vehicle.
Fox for the piaintiff.
The negligence of the carrier, direct or
contributory, cannot be imputed to the
passenger. Dean v. Pa. R. R., 129 Pa. 514;
Little v. Hackett, 116 U. S. 366 ; Jones v.
Lehigh and N. E. R. Co., 202 Pa. 83.
When a person suffers an injury because
of the negligence of two or more persons;
they arejoiutly liable, and may 'be sued
jointly or severally. Borough of Carlisle
v. Brisbane, 113 Pa. 544 ; Dean v. Pa. R.
R., supra.
D. E. KAUTFINAN for the defendant.
"rhefailure of the omnibus driver to stop.
look and listen before attempting to cross
the track, is negligenceper se. R. R. Co.
v. James, 1 V. N. C. 68; Holden v. Pa,
R. R. Co., 169 Pa. 1 ; Shuban v. Phila. &
R. B.. R., 166 Pa. 354.
Action should have been against the cab
driver, his negligence was the proximate
cause, his duty of care was of highelt
order while that of R. R. Co. was of ordinarycare. Herretux. v. City of Lebanon,
149 Pa. 222; Phila. & Reading I. R. v.
Boyer, 97 Pa. 102.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

From the fact that the train started onehalf minute before the usual time, it cannot be said that the engineer should have
exercised particular caution on approaching the crossing, but it is at all times the
duty of such a company to exercise its
rights with a consideration and prudent
regard for the right and safety of others.
Penna. R. Co. v. Barret, 59 Pa. 259.
The engineer of the railroad company
was negligent in not blowing the whistle
or ringingthe bell, as required on approaching a crossing-Reeves v. Delaware, L. &
V. R. Co., 30 Pa. 454; Coleman v. Penia.
R. Co., 195 Pa. 485; and as a result of his
failure to do so, the railroad company is
liable. Phila. & T. R. Co. v. Hogan, 47
Pa. 244.
It was set up as a defense by the railroad
company that the plaintiff's omnibus
driver was guilty of contributory negligence in crossing the track when he knew
the train was about to start.
The clear duty of the omnibus driver,
wheq he came to the crossing, was to use
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every reasonable precaution to avoid injury-Ash v. Wilmington & Northern R.
Co., 148 Pa. 138; and the failure of the engineer to give warning did not exempt
him from this duty. lMcGill v. Railway,
152 Pa. 331.
The omnibus driver was negligent in not
ascertaining definitely whether it was safe
to cross, because he, as a common carrier,
is required to exercise the highest care and
diligence for the safety of the passenger.
Phila. City Pass. R. Co. v. Hassard, 75 Pa.
367; Willock v. Railroad Co., 166 Pa. 184;
Penna. R. Co. v. Henderson, 51 Pa. 315.
Both the omnibus driver-and the railroad
company being the cause of the injury,
was it proper to sue oneand not the other ?
The general rule of law is, where one
suffers injury through the concurrent negligence of two or more persons, they are
jointly liable, and may be prosecuted
against for the damages sustained, either
jointly or severally. Borough of Carlisle
v. Brisbane, 113 Pa. 5.50. Now, if the
driver's negligence is to be imputed to the
passenger, the plaintiff cannot recover.
Lockhart v. Lichtenthaler, 46 Pa. 151;
Phila. & Reading R. Co. v. Boyer, 97 Pa.
91.
This question first arose in the celebrated
English case of Thorogood v. Bryan, 8 0.
B. 115, in which it was held "that a passenger in one omnibus, injured by a collision caused by the negligence of the
driver, wis so identified with such driver
as to prevent his recovery of damages, heeause of the driver's contributory uegligence." This case was overruled in "The
Bernia," L. R. 13 App. Cas., a later English case.
In the case of Little v. Hackett, 116 U.
S.366, the Supreme Court of the United
States held "that a person who had hired
a public hack, and had given the driver
directions as to the place to which he
wished to be conveyed, but exercised no
control over the conduct of the driver, was
not responsible for the latter's acts of negligence, nor prevented from recovering
against a railroad company."
The counsel for the railroad company
contends that the plaintiff ought to be
non-suited, according to the Pennsylvania
case of Lockhart v. Lichtenthaler, 46 Pa.
151, which held, "that where a passenger
in a carrier vehicle is injured by a collision
resulting from the negligence of those in
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charge of it and those in charge of another
vehicle, the carrier only is answerable for
the injury." And the same doctrine was
applied in Phila. & Reading R. Co. v.
Boyer, 97 Pa. 91.
Both of these Pennsylvania decisions
have been overruled. Dean v. Penna. R.
Co., 129 Pa. 514; Bunting v. Hoguth, 139
Pa. 363.
In the late case of Jones v. Lehigh & N.
E. R. Co., 202 Pa. 83, Justice Fell said in
his opinion: " A driver's negligence is
not, as the law now settled, to be imputed
to the occupants of the vehicle, and as this
is the law in Pennsylvania, as it is to-day,
the court cannot do otherwise than direct
a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
J. RALSTON JONES, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

It was error to direct a verdict in favor
of the plaintiff. The driver of the omnibus saw the train, and knew that it was
very soon going to move. It started, for
some reason, a half-minute sooner than
usual, but the bourt could not say that
this was negligence. It did not ring or
whistle, but it would be, we think, for the
jury to say whether this omission was,
under the circumstances, causative of the
accident. Would the driver have refrained
from crossing had the ringing or whistling
occurred? Would it have been a better
indication to the driverof what was about
to happen than that which he discovered
by his eye? He saw the train, and he
urged his horses over the track, believing
that he could cross. If the ringing or
whistling would have shown to the driver
more clearly than what he saw that the
advance of the train was imminent, and
he would have refrained from making the
attempt to cross, the company would have
negligently caused the accident. But it
was for the jury to say so.
The court has so ably disposed of the imputability of the driver's negligence to his
passengers, and, inter alios, to the plaintiff, that we are content to dismiss the
question without further discussion.
Judgment reversed, with v.f. d. n.
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TEMPLE vs. JAMISON.

land and title is made to another. Strimpfler v. Roberts, 18 Pa. 283; Barnet v.
Dugherty, 8 Casey 371.
Resulting trust-Act of June 4, 1901, P. L.
There is no presumption of a gift where
trusts
425, construed as making resulting
wife pays purchase money and deed is
void only as againstbonafide purchasers taken in the name of the husband. Beck's
and mortgageesfor value, where itspro- Executors'v. Graybill & Suartly, 28 Pa. 66.
Act of 1901 does not apply, because a
visions are disregarded-A mortqagee creditor
who takes a mortgage or note only
value
for
apurchaser
not
debt
for a.past
as security for a pre-existing debt, and not
-Neither is a devisee a purchaserfor for money advanced at the time, is not a
purchaser for value. Ashton's Appeal, 73
value.
Pa. 153; Petni v. Clark, 11 S. & R. 377 ;
Hartman v. Doudel, 1 Rawle 280; Twelor
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
v. Williams, 3 Whart. 405; Trotter v.
With Sarah Jamison's money, $4,000, Shippen, 2 Barr 358.

her husband, John, undertook to buy, and
bought, a farm, in the deed for which,
however, he only was named as grantee.
He and his wife moved on the farm. A
year after, without her knowledge, he
made a mortgage for $2,000 upon the farm,
for a loan of money previously made to
him. The mortgagee, William Temple,
devised this mortgage specifically to his
son, John, estimating it at its face value,
and giving to the other three children
$2,000 each. The will stated his intention
to give the four children equal shares.
Subsequently William Temple sued on the
bond accompanying the mortgage, and
caused a sheriff's sale of the farm. becoming the buyer. At the sale, he was notified before his bid that defendant'claimed
the land, as having her lien by a resulting
trust.
LONG for the plaintiff.

A resulting trust is void as to bonafide
judgment or other creditors, orimortgagees
of the holder of the legal title, or purchaser
from such holder, unless either a declaration of trust in writing has been executed,
acknowledged and recorded, or an action
of ejectment by the cestui que trust has
been begun. A wife may bring such an
action against the husband. Act of June
4, 1901, P. L. 425.
To claim a resulting trust, there must
have been an intention at time land was
purchased to take title in name of cestui
que trust, as well as use of her money.
Corman's Appeal, 197 Pa. 125 ; Crawford
v. Thompson, 142 Pa. 551. This evidence
must be clear and convincing. Todd v.
Campbell, 8 Casey 250 ; Strimpfier v. Roberts, 6 Harris 298; Kline's Appeal, 139 Pa.
463.
A pre-existing debt is a valuable consideration, and receipt of security therefor
makes one a bonafide purchaser. Okie v.
Kelley, 12 Pa. 323.
MCNEAL for the defendant.
A resulting trust arises in favor of one
whose money is used for the purchase of

OPINION OF THE COURT.
Jamison, with his wife's money, purchased a farm, taking title to same in his
own name. This is sufficient to establish
primafaciea trust in the wife's favor, but
which is liable to be overthrown by proof
that the payment was a gift of the money
to her husband, the holder of the legal
title. But where the evidence does not
show the intent of the parties in the
transaction, the presumption is, not that
the payment was meant as a gift, but that
the grantee consented to take and to hold
the title in trust for the person advancidg
the money. Lynch v. Cox, 23 Pa. 265.
We, therefore, hold that before our recent
legislation on the subject of resulting
trusts, this would clearly have been such
in favor of the wife.
The Act of June 4, 1901, provides, that
whenever such resulting trust arises, if the
person advancing the money has capacity
to contract, such resulting trust shall be
void and of none effect as to bona fide
judgment or other creditors, ormortgagees
of the holder of the legal title, unless
either a declaration of trust in writing has
been acknowledged by the holder of the
legal title and recorded, or unless an action
of ejectment has been begun by the person
advancing the money. Now, the wife, as
we all know, had power to contract.
And again, we find that she has not
complied with the provisions of the above
statute. But we do not think that these
things enter into the case.
The question is, as we look at it, was
Temple such a mortgagee as courts will
construe the word to mean under the Act
of June 4, 1901? Temple took the mortgage as security for a loan previously made
to Jamison.
The loan may have been made even be-
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fore thefarm was purchased. Atall events,
it appears that the mortgage was given for
a pre-existing debt. Wehavein Pennsylvania a line of cases preceding and following Ashton's Appeal, 73 Pa. 153, which
hold, that where a creditor, who takes a
mortgage, note or other chose in action,
only as security for a pre-existing indebtedness, and not for money advanced at the
time, is not a purchaser for value.
We think the present case is not inconsistent with the line of cases referred to
above.
Believing, therefore, that Temple was
not such a mortgagee as the statute requires, even though the trust was not in
writing and recorded, nor ejectment
brought, we render judgment in favor of
the defendant, thereby holding that them
is a resulting-trust in her favor.
PAUL 0. MENGES, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

A resulting-trust in favor of Sarah Jamison arosg from the grant to her husband.
He had her money for the purpose of buying the land, and he undertook with her
to buy it for her. The question is, can
this trust be set up againstJohn Jamison's
mortgagee ?
Mrs. Jamison was in possession when
the mortgage was made, and this, perhaps,
would have been sufficient notice, prior to
the Act of June 4, 1901, P. L. 425. That
act, however, declares resulting-trusts void
as to bona fide judgment or other creditors or mortgagees of the holder of the
legal title, or purchasers from such holder,
unless either a declaration of trust in writing has been executed, acknowledged and
recorded, or an action of ejectment by the
cestui que trust has been brought. It.
authorizes a wife to bring such action
against her husband.
Neither of these things has been done.
There is no written and recorded declaration of trust. No ejectment had been
brought prior to the making of the mortgage.
The trust is, in terms, invalidated with
respect to bonafide mortgagees. Literally,
William Temple is such. He had no notice of the trust. The debt, to secure which
the mortgage was accepted, was an actual
debt. We do not think, nevertheless, that
it was the intention of the Legislature to
dispense with the mortgagee's being.a pur-
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chaser for value, when securing to him
immunity from the assertion of the trust.
In a vast array of cases, in alljurisdictions,
it has been held that, in order to be protected from the ownership of others than
the one with whom a party deals, he must
give value in reliance on the title with respect to which he deals. To be protected
by the recording acts, he must be not a
bonafide purchaser only, but one for value.
The same is true in order to be protected
from secret trusts. Adamson v. Souder,
205 Pa. 498. Defenses to a negotiable note
are available only to a purchaser forvalue.
It could not have been the intention of
the Legislature to change the law in this
important respect.
Is, then, the plaintiff, who assails the
trust, a bonafide purchaser for value?
The debt was a pre-existing debt. No
surrender of any right was made by the
mortgagee when he accepted the mortgage.
He retained all the rights he had had. He
simply added to them the rights of a mortgagee. He was not, therefore, a purchaser
of the mortgage for value. He gave nothing for it. Adamson v. Souder, 205 Pa.
498; Callendar v. Kelly, 190 Pa. 455;
Pratt's Appeal, 77 Pa. 378.
But, it is possible that, though William
Temple himself was not a purchaser for
value, John Temple is such a purchaser.
If so, he will doubtless be protected, as
William Temple would have been. The
mortgage was devised to John specifically,
at the valuation of $2,000. But a devisee
or legatee is not a purchaser for value.
But for the devise to him, John would,
doubtless, have shared in the other property of William Temple, but as this property never was John's, he cannot be said
to have purchased the mortgage by relinquishing his right to a share in the other
property. William, as owner, could do
what he would with his own.
But, It is not John that enforced the
mortgage, but William himself. He foreclosed the mortgage by obtaining judgment on the accompanying bond, andselling upon it the premises in dispute. He
became the buyer. If we suppose that,
under the bequest of the mortgage, the
land would pass to the legatee, John, John
cannot be deemed a purchaser for value.
The ownership of William was impaired
by the notice, at the sheriff's sale, of Sarah
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Jamison's title. William, therefore, did
not improve his position, as against the
trust, by %ispurchase. It could be asserted
successfully against him. As John paid
nothing for the land, but got it as a devisee, he is not a purchaser for value, and
the trust can be enforced against him.
The Act of 1901 requires the recordingof
a declaration of trust, or the bringing of
an ejectment. But, as ejectment is designed to recover possession, it is not to be
supposed that the Legislature had in view
a case in which the cestui que trust was
already in possession. If we apply the Act
of 1901 to Mrs. Jamison, we practically say
that unlessshe was able to procure a declaration of trust from her husband before the
latter mortgaged the land, she would lose
her land. It does not appear that she intended the deed from her vendor to be
made to her husband. How is she to be
held responsible for his making himself
the grantee without her authority? What
she would properly be responsible for
would be her refraining, after notice of the
form ofthe deed, from filing a bill in equity
to compel a declaration of trust, or from
asserting ownership by taking possession.
It could scarcely have been the intention
of the General Assembly to forfeit her
trust simply because she had not obtained
a declaration of trust when she was in
possession. We do not think John Tempie qualified to dispute the validity of the
trust.
Judgment affirmed.

compelled to testify. She said that her
husband had had certain described symptoms, and she believed the disease was
consumption. The president, the medical
examiner, and the agent of the company
who took the application, testified for the
company to the bad state of the health of
the assured.
HASSERT for the plaintiff.
A husband or wife is not competent to
testify against the other in any case in
which the interests of the other are involved. Pleasonton v. Nutt, 19 W. N. C.
120; Johnson v. Watson, 157 Pa. 454 ;
Sahms v. Brovin, 19 Phila. 448. The representatives of the company are incoinpetent to testify, one of the parties to the
contract being dead. P. & L. col. 4835;
Cites also Neely's Est., 4 Pa. C. C. 644;
Mell v. Barner, 13.5 Pa. 151 ; Wolf v. Wolf,
158 Pa. 62 ; Parry v. Parry, 130 Pa. 94;
Duffield v. Hue, 26 W. N. C. 387.
HELLER for the defendant.
Cited Act M\ay 23, 1887 ; also Boyd v.
ConshohockeiN Mills, 149 Pa. 363.

OPINION OF THE COURT.
The persons rendered incompetent by
Clause "E," Section 5, of the Act May 23,
1837, are described as "Any surviving or
remaining party tosuch thing or contract,
or any other person whose interest shall
be adverse to the said right of such deceased, or lunatic party." Thus, parties
whose interest is adverse to the right of
the deceased party may be composed either
of surviving or remaining parties to the
thing or contract in action, or of persons
not a party thereto. Trickett on Witnesses, sec. 185.
In the case at bar the evidence of the
SARAH TWILLER vs. LIFE INS. CO.
president of the corporation, which was a
party to the thing in action, was allowed
Evidence-Life insurance-Powerof officers and agent of company to testify, and to testify as to matters occurring before the
death of the other party to the contract, to
competency ofwife considered under Act
wit: the insured. His testimony was adMay 25, 1887.
verse to the interest of the deceased, as it
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
tended to prevent a recovery on the contract of insurance. We are of the opinion
William Twiller obtained on his life a
that the clause of the Act of 1887 referred
policy for $2,000. The policy stipulated
to, prohibited such testimony, and that it
that if, at the time of its issue, the assured,
was error to admit it.
whether he knew it or not, had any seriThe wife of the deceased was also called
ous disease, such as consumption, cancer,.
as on cross-examination, ajpd compelled to
Bright's disease, etc., it was to be void.
testify. Her testimony was also adverse
He dying, his administrator sues the comto the interest of her husband, the depany on the policy, which alleges that he
ceased.
had consumption at the time of taking the
The law has exempted one spouse from
insurance. The company called Sarah
detriment by the adverse testimony of
Twiller for cross-examination, and she was
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another. This testimony the witness cannot give, if willing, nor, if unwilling, can
it be extorted from him. Callender v.
Kelley, 190 Pa. 455, and Rourke v. McGrath, 1 Brewster 302.
When the action is founded on the right
of a husband or wife, the husband or wife
cannot be compelled by the opposite party
to testify as on cross-examination under
the Act of 1865 or the Act of 1887. Trickett
on Witnesses, sec. 63.
These acts do not authorize one party
calling the husband or wife of the opposite party. Trickett on Witnesses, p. 58;
Rourke v. McGrath, 1 Brewster 302, and
Callender v. Kelley, 190 Pa. 455.
In acivil or criminal proceeding to which
the husband or wife is a party, he or she
can object to calling the husband or wife
to testify against him or her, but the objection to competency can be made in other
cases also. Thus, in an action against an
administrator of an estate of which a married woman was a legatee, the administrator objected to the testimony against him
of the husband. Alcern v. Cook, 101 Pa.
313. In this case the administrdtor of the
deceased could object to the competency of
the wife.
We are of the opinion that it was error
to compel the wife to testify as on crossexamination.
Judgment reversed, and venirefaciasde
novo awarded.
C. A. SPENCER, J.
OPINION OF TRE SUPREME COURT.

In this action by the administratrix of
the assurca against the company, its president, its medical examiner and an agent
testified for the defendant. The learned
court below has held that they were not
competent. Why? They were not parties to theaction. They had nopecuniary
interest in it. They were plainly competent. Sargeant v. Nat. Life Ins. Co., 189
Pa. 341 ; Witnesses, p. 144.
The administratrix, plaintiff, was called
by the defendant, and thecourt compelled
her to testify. Her testimony was adverse
to herown clain: The learned court below
has held that she could not be compelled to
testify. But why not?
Because the assured was dead? But,
her interest was not adverse, though her
testimony proved to be so, to the right of
the deceased. On the contrary, her testi-
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mony was expected to be, and proved tb
be, adverse to her own interest.
Was she immulne from compulsion because she was a party? The Act of 1887
distinctly authorizes such compulsion.
Was she superior to compulsion because
she was the widow of the deceased? Husband and wife cannot testify against each
other. But a surViving husband or wife
can testify against the administrator of the
other. He is not then testifying against
his wife. Witnesses, p. 64.
Facts disclosed in marital confidence, it is
true, cannot be compulsorily revealed after
the death of one spouse by the survivor.
Witnesses, 85. Had it appeared that the
fact to which Mrs. Twiller was required to
testify had been learned in that confidence,
compelling her to testify to it would have
been improper. But we see nothing indicative that her testimony revealed any matt.er learned by her through the confidence
of the husband. Any nurse or relative,
waiting on the husband, would have
learned the same facts. The mere fact that
she would not have been with him, and,
therefore, would not have learned that he
had consumption, does not make the fact
a communication. It doesnotappear that
she depended on his statements to her for
her knowledge of his disease. She would
not have known it had she not been his
wife, perhaps, just as the attorney, in
Daniel v. Daniel, 39 Pa. 191, Witnesses,
14, would not have known the imbecility
of his client had he not been attorney, but
as the attorney did not, for that reason,
betray confidence in testifying to the imbecility, so Mrs. Twiller does not betray it
in testifying to her husband's malady.
Cf. Witnesses, p. 87 et seq. It is not nch
to be wondered at that the judgment of
the court should be erroneous, in view of
the grossly inadequate investigation of
counsel. Scarcely a single apposite citation can be found on either brief. On one
of them only one case is cited, and this
citation and a short quotation from the
Act of May 23, 1887, constitute the whole
store of erudition of its author. Such palpable indifference to duty cannot be too
severely censured.
The judgment of the Superior Court is
reversed, and the judgment of the Court of
Common Pleas is reinstated and affirmed.

rio
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ARCHBALD vs. CUMBERLAND
VALLEY R. R. CO.

of care. The cases generally recognize that
the carrier must exercise the utmost care
under the circumstances short of a warAssumpsit for damages-Public cariers ranty of the safety of the passenger. Wil-eglqence-Act
of God-Degree of
lock v. R. R., 166" Pa. 184.
care to be exercised by public carriers.
The carrier is bound to exercise extraordinary vigilance, aided by the highest
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
skill. Hale on Bailments, 519.
Tie plaintiff bought a ticket from HarProof of an accident not resulting from
risburg to Carlisle from the defendant
the act of the passenger is sufficient to raise
company. A violent thunderstorm arose
a presumption of actionable negligence on
during the trip, and a decaying tree, which
the part of the carrier. Phila. & R. R. R.
stood on rightof way of railroad company,
v. Anderson, 94 Pa. 351.
The defendants have endeavored to rewas struck by lightning and fell across the
but this presumptioh by an attempt to
track. Tile train was thereby thrown
show that it was an inevitable accident,
from the track, and the passenger suffered
that it was caused solely by an "act of
severe injuries, which resulted to him of
God," and that, as a consequence, they are
$500 for care, attention and loss of time.
not liable.
On these facts he seeks to recover from
It follows from the definition of an "act
the defendant the said sum.
of God," as an act of nature entirely unBARNER and BARNHART for the plainconnected with any human agency, that
tiff.
it must be the exclusive cause of the inDefendant is liable for failure to keep the
jury, or the carrier will be liable.
road in a safe condition. Hey v. Phila.,
81 Pa. 44; Sullivan v. P. & R. R. R. Co.,
The true test is the entire absence of any
30 Pa. 234.
human agency in producing the injury.
The act of God would not have produced
Merritt v. Earle, 29 N. Y. 115.
the injury if the defendant had not been
Tile "act of God" must be such that, by
negligent in failing to remove the tree.
Gleeson v. V. M. R. R. Co., 140 U. S. 435.
its own force, and independent of any
The fact of the derailment of the train is
negligence on the part of the defendants,
of itself presumptive evidence of negliwould have produced the injury. The
gence on the part of the defeindant. Curcases all hold, that if there is a concurrence
tis v. R. & S. R. R. Co., 18 N. Y. 534.
of negligence with the act of God in proDAvIs and KAUFMAN, D. E., for the deducing the injury, such "act of God" canfendant.
not be set up as a defense.
As to what constitutes an act of God.
It is true, that the mere existence of
Heibliz v. Allegheny Cemetery, 201 Pa.
171; B. & 0. R. R. Co. v. S. C. I. School
negligence, which is not a producing cause
District, 96 Pa. 65 ; Davis v. Morrison, 20
of the injury, creates no liability ; but if
Pa. 171.
the negligence shown is a producing cause,
Before plaintiff can recover, he must
it follows that the "act of God " was not
show that defendant company was guilty
of negligence which was the producing
the exclusive cause, and the one guilty of
cause of the injury.
such negligence will be held liable. Phila.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
& R. R. R. v. Anderson, 94 Pa. 351.
The plaintiff's right to recover damages
The case, then, resolves itself down to
in this case rests on the universal principle,
the question, whether or not the railroad
that he who, to the injury of another,
company was negligent in maintaining on
its rightof way a noticeably decaying tree.
neglects a duty that by law he ought to
A road may be perfectly safe undersome
perform, is liable to compensate the injury.
An artificial person is equally liable to
circumstances, and very unsafe under
others. If the tree was decaying, it was
the operation of this rule.
in imminent danger of Tailing across the
Public carriers of passengers exercise a
tracks, even though the danger was not
public calling, and by so doing have certain exceptional liabilities imposed on
aggravated by a violent thunderstorm.
them to which private carriers are not sub.
These violent actions of the elements
may be readily foreseen and guarded
jeet.
A carrier of passengers is bound to exeragainst, and a failure to do so will ordinacise toward passengers a very high degree
rily be negligence, which is regarded as
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the proximate cause of the loss, rather
than the action of the elements.
From the fact that such violent actions
of the elements as a thunderstorm are common to this section of the country, even a
sound tree would be dangerous by reason
of its proximity to the railroad tracks, for,
frequently in such storms, limbs of sound
trees are blown down and might be blown
across the tracks, and it is not even common prudence to allow a decaying tree on
the property of the defendants to stand so
near the tracks, and their neglect in this
respect was such a producing cause of the
injury as will make them liable in this action.
Judgment is accordingly entered for the
plaintiff.
F. P. BEN3"AMIN, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

A " decaying tree," standing within the
way of the railroad, was struck by lightning, and, falling across the tracksagainst
the car of a passing train, injured the
plaintiff. Why is he to be indemified by
the company ?
Does the fact that the tree was standing
within the way make the company liable?
We cannot think so.
Does the fact that the tree was a" decaying tree" make it liable? It is the
duty, doubtless, of the company to examine its ties, rails, roadbed, its cars and engines, everything pertaining to its road,
and thd vehicles that run over it, in order
to see that they are not possible causes of
injury. If there are trees near the track,
which it can control, it should doubtless
adopt means to prevent their becoming a
danger in consequence of decay, etc. If
the decay of the tree had occasioned its
fall, we might hold, with the learned court
below, that primafacie, at least, the company was responsible. Nothing shows,
however, that without the decay of the
tree it would not have fallen. We know
not the species of the tree, its size, the
character of the lightning discharge. We
cannot judicially know that this tree, of
which we apprehend so little, would not
have fallen from the lightning bolt, of
which we know equally little, had the tree
not been decayed. Nor do we know to
what extent the decay had advanced, nor
whether it was of such a sort that the utmost diligence would have detected it.

III

The tree is described, in the evidence, as
"decaying," rather than "decayed." Unless we are prepared to say that a railroad company cannot allow a tree to
stand within its way, without making itself, ipso facto, liable for any injury of
which the tree may become the instrument, we do not see how, on the evidence
before the court below, we or a jury are to
say that the defendant was liable.
We concede that if the decay of the tree
had advanced so far that a reasonably
vigilant examination would have disclosed
it, and if, but for this decay, the stroke of
lightning would not have caused the injury to the plaintiff, the defendant would
be liable. The learned court below well
says that thunderstorms must in this regiou be expected, and their not imnprobable effects on trees anticipated, and the
proper precautions against resulting injuries adopted. But the doctrine which
the court has, in substance, announced is,
that the mere fact that a tree, which is
"decayinmg," and standing within the way
of a railroad, is prostrated by a. lightning
stroke, makes the company liable for the
consequent hurt. This weare unable to accept.
Judgment reversed, with v.f. d. n.
JARRED vs. STAPLES.
Sale of realproperty under administrator
-Balance of purchase pricepaid after
five years-Ejectment-Act of April 8,
1833.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
The land of John Hipple, deceased, was

sold by his administrator, under the Orphans' Court, to William Jarred, who paid
two-thirds of the money, took possession,
but did not complete the payment or receive a deed. After a possession of five
years he died, leaving his widow, Sarah
Jarred. and a daughter, Hannah. His
administrator paid the purchase money
still due, and received a deed, naming
Sarah Jarred grantee of one-third for life,
and Hannah as grantee in fee, subject to

Sarah Jarred's interest. Hannah married
William Staples and died, leaving a son
to survive. The son died three months
after, his father surviving. Staples died,
leaving his mother his heir. Sarah Jarred
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is still alive, and claims the land in this

ejectment against William Staples, Sr.
JONES and CAREY for the plaintiff.
One not of the -blood from whom the
real estate descended, or by whom it was
given or devised to the intestate, cannot
take the real estate bv inheritance. Act
of April 8, 1833; Bevan v. Taylor, 7 S. &
R. 397; Perot's Appeal, 102 Pa. 235; Lewis
v. Gorman, 5 Pa. 164; M1cDowell v. Thomas,
13 Pa. 41 ; Maffit v. Clark, 6 W. & S. 258;
Robert's Appeal, 39 Pa. 417; Danner v.
Shissler, 31 Pa. 289; McWilliams v. Ross,
46 Pa. 369; Duffies' Estate, 13 Phila. 334.
JACOBS, J. W., and KAUFFMAN, D. E.,
for the defendant.
The fee vested in William Staples at the
death of the son, and upon his death his
only heir is his mother. Rauck's Appeal,
113 Pa. 98; Roger's Estate, 131 Pa. 382.
The administrator has the power to pay
the remaining purchase money. Parkinson's Appeal, 132 Pa. 450; Simpson v.
Hall, 4 S. & R. 337.
Upon the death of the mother, the fee
vested in the son, subject to the dower of
the widow. Act of 8th April, 1833, P. L.
315.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The land of John Hipple was sold by his
administrator, under rule of the Orphans'
Court. His property was sold to William
Jarred, who paid two-thirds of the purchase price, took possession, but did not
receive adeed. After a period of fl:e years
he died, leaving a widow, Sarah Jarred,
and daughter, Hannah. His administrator paid the purchase money still due and
received a deed, naming Sarah Jarred as
grantee of one-third for life, and Hannah
as grantee in fee.
This is all vory clear, and leaves room
for no argument. The administrator, in
paying the unpaid purchase money and
receiving in the deed the same interests as
they would have received had the property
come to them by descent, gave them such
an interest that the common law looks
upon them as taking by descent and not
by purchase, and it is so held in Kinney
v. Glasgow, 53 Pa. 141.
Hannah, the daughter, married William
Staples, and died, leaving a son to survive.
The son died three months after, his father
surviving. Staples died, leaving his mother
his heir. Sarah Jarred is still alive, and
claims the land in ejectment against William Staples, Sr. Upon the death of the
mother, Hannah Staples, the fee passed to
the son, according to the Act of 8th April,

1833, 1. The Act of 8th April, 1833,
p,
provides, that no person who is not of the
blood of the ancestor, or other relations,
from whom the estate descended, or by
whom it was given or devised to the intestate, shall in any of the cases before
mentioned take any inheritance therein..
Now, under this provision we cannot see
how either the father, Sarah Jarred or
Mrs. Staples, Sr., can base any claim
whatsoever upon the property ih question,
as they are without blood relation to the
one from whom the property descended,
and such has been held by a long line of
cases in Pennsylvania, among them McDowell v. Thomas, 13 Pa. 41: Robert's
Appeal, 39 Pa. 417; Maffit v. Clarke, 6 W.

&S. 258.

Since there is no one competent to inherit, the eleventh section of the Act of
8th April, 1833, comes to the rescue, and
states that in such ease the real as well as
the personal estate of an intestate shall
pass to and be enjoyed by the next of kin
of such intestate, without regard to the
ancestor or other relation from whom such
estate may have come, and this has been
interpreted in McDowell v. Thomas, 13 Pa.
41; Rauck's Appeal, 113 Pa. 98, and Roger's
Estate, 131 Pa. 383.
Inasmuch as the son has no heir who is
competent to inherit under the act stated
above, his father would be the one next of
kin, and to him the fee would pass; and,
upon the same grounds, upon the father's
death the property would pass to his
mother, who in this case is Mrs. Staples,
and it is the opinion of the court that, in
view of the statutes on the subject, apd
from the past interpretations placed upon
them, that the fee, in .defaultof takers by
blood relation, should pass to Mrs. William
Staples, and so the court decrees.
E. F. HELLER, J.
Per curiam.
Judgment affirmed.
BAUMHOFF vs. COOK, ET AL.
Assumpsit for damages-Contractbetween
corporation and private person, dependent on legislation to be passedDemurrer to petition sustained on
grounds of "publicpolicy."
STATEAENT OF THE CASE.

The Oklahoma City Electric and Gas
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and Power Co. is a corporation organized
under the laws of Oklahoma, with a capital stock of $150,000. Previous to Dec.
10th, 1901, and for some time after that
date, E. R. Cooke, G. W. Wheeler and G.
W. Beebe were the owners of the entire
(apital stock, and on that day entered into
a stipulation in writing, executed in the
name of the company and subscribbd by
them severally, whereby they agreed to
sell and transfer all the stock, together
with all the property and franchises of the
company to George W. Baumhoff for a
consideration of $120,000, a copy of which
is s follows:
OKLAHOMA- CITY,
December 10, 1901.
[n the consideration of the sum of one
dollar received from George W. Baumhoff, we hereby agree to sell to the
said George W. Baumhoff, his succes.sors or assigns, 1500 shares, constituting all the shares and capital stock
of the Oklahoma City Electric and
Gas and Power Company of the City of
Oklahoma, Territory of Oklahoma, of the
par value of one hundred dollars each, for
the sum of one hundred and twenty
thousand dollars, to be paid in cash.
This sale to be consummated within ten
days after an amendment duly passed by
ordinance enacted by the city council of
the City of Oklahoma, such amendment
to said ordinance to be mutually agreed
upon between the president and secretary
of said company and the purchaser before
to same is introduced in the council.
The above shares of stock shall convey
all the property, rights, privileges, grants
and franchises of said Oklahoma City Electric and Gas and Power Company, free
from all debts of all kinds, excepting a
sum not to exceed $2,000 for eight inch
gas pipe, now in the grounds and in route,
as billed from the Dimmick Pipe Company, of Birmingham, Ala., and one electric generator, from the Western Electric
Company, of St. Louis, Mo., at not to exceed $2.200, which the purchaser assumes
to pay for within ten days after the passage of the ordinance by the city council
and approved by the mayor of Oklahoma
City, 0. T., satisfactory to the purchaser.
The sum of $120,000, in cash, to be
paid by the purchaser within thirty
days after such ordinance amending the

ii

franchise of said company satisfactory to
the purchaser is adopted. The purchaser
to take possession of the property at once
upon the payment of the entire consideration of the property. It is further agreed
that any betterments which may be required, such as lamps, meters or wires
bought before December 30, 1901, shall be
paid f6r by the purchaser.
Oklahoma City Electric and Gas and
Power Company.
G. W. WHEELER,
By E. H. COOKE,
Pres.
Sec'y.
G. N. BEEBE.
E. H. COOKIE,
G. W. WHEELER.
Accepted:
GEO. W. BAUMHOFF.
Shortly after this contract was made a
third party appeared and offered $20,000
more, or $140,000, for the same property on
the same terms. And a few days later
when Baumhofr returned prepared to
carry the transaction to a conclusion, the
sellers refused to proceed. Being unable,
after persistent efforts, to induce them to
proceed to carry out the contract, Baumhoff *returned to his home in St. Louis.
Shortly after he left, the contemplated
amendment was passed by the city council and approved by the mayor, and on
learning of it he again returned to Oklahoma City and offered payment and demanded performance of the contract,
which was refused. Previous to his arrival the sale to the other parties for $140,000 had been so far concluded as to put it
out of the power of the defendants to deliver to him.
In providing for the means and making
preparations for the performance of the
contract he incurred expenses, which he
alleges exceed $50,000.
Being unable to secure or enforce the
contract he brought an action for damages
for its breach in the sum of $60,000, in the
District Court of Oklahoma County, 0. T.,
and a demurrer being filed to the petition
of the plaintiff, which, on being heard
was sustained, and shortly thereafter an
amended petition was filed and a demurrer to it also was sustained, on the
grounds that- the contract between the
parties hereto was against"Public Policy."
Now the plaintiff takes this appeal to the
Supreme Court of the Territory and prays
for judgment.
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HouCK for the plaintiff.
The contract was not opposed to public
pllicy,and thereby rendered illegal. Lewis
v. Davison, 4 M. & W. 6.53; Lord Hlowden
v. Simpson. 37 E. C. L. 429; Milbank v.
Jones, 147 N. Y. 370.
The contract did not create an agent for
an undisclosed principal. Fuller v. Dant,
18 Pick. (Mass.) 480; Clippinger v. Hepbaugh, 5 W. & S. 315.
Contracts to secure legislation, declared
void as against public policy, have been
cases where one of the coutracting parties
has been the agent of the other, and was
to have a contingent fee, or to use his personal influence, or other improper means.
In no case are the rights of third persons,
not parties to securing the proposed legis.
lation, affected by the methods used in its
procurement. Hatzfield v. Gulden.7Watts
(Pa.) 152; Spaldini v. Ewing, 149Pa. 375;
Mills v. M[ills, 40 N. Y. 543; Marshall v.
B. & 0. R. R. Co., 16 How. (U. S) 314;
Bryan v. Reynolds, 5 Wis. 200.
FLYNN for the defendant.
The character of legislation to be passed
is immaterial. Trist v. Child, 21 Wall.

(U. S ) 441 ; Wood v. McCann, 6 Dana

i Ky.) 366 ; Frost v. Belmont, 6 Allen 152.
In order to render a contract in violation
of law illegal, it is not necessary that there
shall exist any corrupt intention on the
part of the contracting parties. Senala
Bank v. Lamb, 26 Bart. (N. Y.) 595. Nor
does it matter that nothing improper was
done or expected to be done; it is enough
that such is the tendency of the contract.
Clippinger v. Hepbaugh, 5 W. & S. 315 ;
Hlatzfield v. Gulden, 7 Watts 152; Spalding v. Ewing, 149 Pa. 375 ; Must v. Child,
21 VaII. (U. S.) 441.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Plaintiff's case in the court below was
demurred to on the ground that the writiug therein declared on and proved did not
in la:w constitute a valid contract, the same
being challenged as contrary to good public policy, and, consequently, illegal and
void. This demurrer being sustained, he
brings this appeal.
It may be declared as unquestionable
law that, under equal powers, no distinctions, no differences whatever, exist between the contracts of a corporation and
those of a natural person, either as to form,
consideration or subject matter. So that,
without reciting at length all the facts
which make this concern a perfect artificial person under our laws, we may say ii
brief, as it was a going concern, having
the management and possession of its
property, and possessedof all rights, privileges and duties of such a person, all legal

principles which apply to the contracts of
any person, apply with equal force to this
one. Lyon v. Mitchell, 36 N. Y. 240;
Vreeland v. Stone, 29 N. J. Eq. 188; Ramsey v. Manufacturing Co., 116 Mo. 313;
Bradley v. Poole, 98 Mass. 169.
The crucial question is, was there anything contrary to public policy in thestipulation of the contract that an ordinance
amending thecity ordinance, then in force,
granting certain franchises to the corporation, should be mutually agreed upon between the parties, and passed by the city
council, before the sale and transfer contracted for should be consummated?
Stipulations, in principle and character
very similar to thisone, have received some
judicial sanction in England (Lord Howden v. Simpson, 37 E. 0. L. 429; Lewis v.
Davison, 4 M. & W. 6.56), but we cannot
accept this precedent as of any weight in
this State, owing chiefly to certain violent
contrasts between the legislative processes
in the cobigress and legislative bodies of
this country, and of its several States, and
those in that of England, particularly in
reference to private acts, and their passage.
The argument that when a contract is
made in general terms broad enough to
include things lawful and unlawful, it
shall be presumed that they intended those
only which are lawful, is a cogent and unanswerable argument only where the contract is alleged as void on the ground that
it contains stipulations to do unlawful acts.
Fuller v. Dame, 18 Pick. 481.
Our law goes further than merely to annul contracts where the obvious and
avowed purpose is to do, or cause the doing, of an unlawful act. It is sufficient
that it be deleterious to private morals, injurious to public welfare, or antagonistic
to the integrity of domestic, civil or politicalinstitutionsof a State. And noheight
of character, or integrity in the parties, or
the absence of matter suggesting a probability of resort to improper influences, will
have any effect to ward off the branding
stamp of the law's disapprobation. Trist
v. Child, 21 Wall. 441; Jones v. Randall,
1 Cowper 39; Marshall v. B. & 0. R. R.
Co., 16 Hlaw. 314. Such contracts as create a strong incentive to the exercise of
personal and sinister extraneous secret influences upon legislative orjudicial authorities, or which create any personal or
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pecuniary interest in legislation, are abso- enced, voting according to his conscielee
lutely void from their very inception, and
and judgmentupon thesame when it canme
before him as a legislator. This might
where a contractual interest is contingent
on the passage of a bill, it is the law, that
either be actually so or only apparently.
it is such a direct incentive to the exertion
But would such a policy of winking down
of more than legitimate influences as to the real essence of danger on a mere possibility strike down in its very inception a
constitute such a void contract. It is not
material that nothing improper was done, possible stealthy and selfish personal influor was expected to be done, by any party
encing, which, though veiled well, is deadly
still, controlling the vote and directing it,
or parties to the contract, either directly
or indirectly. It is enough that such is fettering and trammeling "the conscience
the tendency of the contract, that it will
none the less, because its touch is so artislead necessarily, in the hands of designing
tically light and its rein so gentle in its
and corrupt men, to improper tampering
guidance as not t. rudely shock an unsuswith such authorities as stand at the head pecting one by its presence? We cannot so
of our legislative or judicial departments,
decide. The condemnation of such conto the deceiving or misleading of either all, tracts rests upon theircorrupting tendency.
or of even a part of them, or of a single Absence of motive to do wrong will secure
member. Brown v. Brown, 34 Barb. (N.
sanction of the courts; presence of such in
Y.) 533; Bryan v. Reynolds, 5 Wis. 200;
either party, or in the Legislature, its cerChesebrough v. Canover, 140 N. Y. 382;
tain prohibition. We think a motive to
Clippinger v. Shepbaugh, 5 W. & S. 317; do wrong exists in this case. Whatever
Wood v. McCann, 6 Dana (Ky.) 366; Mar- the privilege or immunity sought under
shall v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., supra; Hatz- the amendment may have been is not mafield v. Gulden, 7 Watts 1.52 ; Bowman v. terial, but "it may be assumed to have
been of a pecuniary value." Such a conCoifroth, 59 Pa. 19; Armerod v. Dearman,
100 Pa. 561 ; Tool Co. v. Norris, 2 Wall. 48- tract as this is a contract leading to the
56. So careful is the law to exclude all in- use of secret, improper and corrupt tamfluences, such as these, that it has been
pering with the legislative arm of our govdecided that a concealnent of the fact that ernmental system. TMills v. Mills, supra;
one securing the passage of an act was an
Fuller v. Dame, supra;Sedgwick v. Staunagent, acting for a compensation or inter- ton, 14 N. Y. 289; Frost v. Allen, 6 Allen
est. contingent, either by agreement so to 159; Powers v. Skinner, 34 Vt. 281; Spauldconceal, or even in the absence of such ing v. Ewing, 149 Pa. 375.
agreement if, in fact, he did so conceal,
There is no difference whatever in sound
would render the agreement for compen- legal principle and in logical effect besation void. Also, a contract founded on
tween an express stipulation in a written
a valuable consideration, which contem- or oral agreement to pay either a definite
plated the amendment of a bill in the Leg- or a contingent sum, as a percentage of a
islature in course of passage, or considera- definite or contingent sum, the possibility
tion so as to limit franchises thereby to of securing either of which sums or inbe granted to certain parties other than terests at all, as well as its size, may or
the grantees named in the bill, or an agree- may not depend on the mere susceptiment that it should be amended from time bility of a party in interest under the conto time in such manner as should be agreed tract to yield to a temptation of resorting
upon by and between the said parties to to corrupt and illegitimate influences in
the contract, is equally void in its every order to secure the promised benefit, and
part; and further, that a contract which that of a contract between parties, the concontemplated the transfer for a valuable summation of which and the benefits conseconsideration of franchises to be granted quent and dependent thereon, can flow
to a firm for the privilege of operating a only when a specific piece of legislation is
street railway, is void as against public duly passed, when in the former as in the
latter, a specific piece of legislation is conpolicy. Mills v. Mills, 40 N. Y. 546. It is
true, as has been contended in this case, templated. Each looks to the passage of
the act on which its interests are dependthat each member might act in relation
to the measure entirely free and uninflu- ent. One says "this legislation I want'
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and offers a sum either definite or contingent on the passage of the act. The
other says, "The subject matter of this
contract I want and the legislation I
want, but I don't want the subject matter
without the legislation," and specifies the
price embodying inducement stifficient to
be accepted, be it real or imaginary as to
its substantiality. The property may or
it may not be very much desired. The
legislation may be very much the more
desired as it generally is or it may be
but secondary. However this may be, it
is not material so far as the even eye of
the law and public policy is concerned.
It is sufficient that it offers such temptations and possibilities as the law abhors.
The property involved in such a case, too,
may be but a mere blind to the real
essence of the transaction for the concealment of a gigantic and perfidious piece of
lobbying. If such a contract as this could
be sustained an avenue both easy of access
and broad and free would be opened at
once for all into the very heart of all legislation, whether municipal, State or federal,
or all of these.
The judgment of the learned District
Court on the demurrer was right and is,
therefore, affirmed.
Yocum, J.
Per curiam..
Judgment affirmed.
IN RE ESTATE OF CATHARINE
BURKE, )DECEASED.
Decedent's Estate-The right of a husband to administerthe estate of his wife,
upon his death before remuneration,
passes to his administratorand through
him to his children.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Catharine Burke died on the 26th day
of January, 1902, intestate, and the Register of Wills did on the 17th day of February, 1902, grant letters of administration on her estate to John Holder, a
brother of the decedent. The said Catharine Burke left to survive her no children,
but a husband, Samuel Burke, who died
on the 1st day of February, 1902, without
administering on his wife's estate or renouncing his right to administer or appointing any one to administer in his
stead.

Samuel Burke left to survive him children by a former marriage, to wit: Frank,
Sarah, Maud and Helen Burke. Helen
Burke, now Mrs. Helen Foj, petitions the
Register of Wills for a citation upon John
Holder to show cause why the letters
granted to him should not be revoked
by the Register and the petitioner appointed.
The Register of Wills dismissed the
petition and refused to revoke the letters
of administration granted to John Holder.
Mrs. Helen Foy appeals to the Orphans'
Court.
LONG for appellant.
Upon the death of a married woman
without issue her separate personal estate
passes to the husband -absolutely. Act of
1848, P. & L. Dig. Col. 9910.
Upon the death of the husband the
property will descend to his children, and
being entitled to the property are entitled
to letters of administration based on the
ground of interest. EllenLaker's Estate,
4 Watts 34; Davis' Estate. 14 Lancaster
Bar 182; Page's Estate, 75 Pa. 89; Coover's
Appeal, 52 Pa. 427; Deginther's Appeal,
83 Pa. 337; Jones' Appeal, 10 W. N. C. 249.
MENGES for appellee.
On a woman's death her chattels and
choses in action go into administration
and not to her husband by survivorship.
Page's Estate, 75 Pa. 89; Gibb v. Phila.
Saving Fund Society, 153 Pa. 345.
The right of administration with regard
to order is (1) husband or wife, (2) lineal
descendants, (3) father or mother, (4)
brothers and sisters. P. & L. Dig. Col.
1465. Note 4.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
According to the weight of authority
in Pennsylvania, letters of administration are granted according to the interest
in the estate, 4 Watts 34, and the statute
provides the.order in which the grant
shall be made. 1." Husband or wife, 2.
lineal descendants, 3. father or mother,
4. brothers or sisters, etc., P. & L. C. 1465.
The appellant, Mrs. Helen Foy, does not
come within the classification, whereas
the appellee, John Holder, is under the
fourth. We cannot see that the appellant
had any other than a prospective interest
in the estate of Catharine Burke. While
it is true that Samuel Burke had the prior
right to letters of administration, yet it
does not appear that he attempted to exercise this right, which being a personal
one, died with him, and did not descend
to his heirs.
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It appears from the facts that an administrator was necessary-and after his
appointment the estate passed into his
control, and not into the control of Samuel
Burke. 75 Pa. 89; 153 Pa. 45. Appellant
had a prospective interest only till
after the administration. On thecoutrary,
appellee was next of kin and first in
interest.
We admit appellant's 1st and 2nd
points. But they presuppose a condition
of affairs which rarely occurs, viz: No
debts; no money in bank; no property except that which may be handed over to
the one entitled, without any administratiou. We do not think this was the case
here, or there would have been no administrator in the first place. As there was
an administrator appointed there must
have been property such as would necessitate his appointment, and upon his appointment the personal estate passed into
his control and not into the control of
Samuel Burke. Therefore, the control of
the property, for which the appellant contends and claims from her father, could
not descend to her.
Whenever letters of administration are
necessary the Register havingjurisdiction
shall grant them to such relation as he
shall judge will best administer the estate,
preferring those so entitled as are in the
nearest degree of consanguinity with the
decedent, and also preferring males to
females. P. & L. 1463-77. It is left
largely to the discretion of the Register,
within certain limits, who shall be appointed. We think he has kept within
these limits and see no valid reason for
revoking the letters granted to John
Holder.
Register's decree confirmed.
CAREY, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The husband of Mrs. Burke was entitled
to letters of administration. He died,
however, after her, not having applied for
letters. As Mrs. Burke left no issue, her
husband was entitled to all her personal
estate. The principle of the 22nd section
of the Act of March 15, 1832, is, that letters
shall be granted to such persons as receive
the personal estate. The husband receiving all, could have nominated another to
act as administrator, and his nominee
would have been entitled. Coover's Ap-

peal, 52 Pa. 427. He did not do this. On
his death, his right to the wife's estate has
passed to his administrator, and through
him, to his children, of whom there are
four, two sons and two daughters. One of
these, we think, should receive the letters.
John Holder is in no sense interested in
his sister's estate, and should not be allowed ti intermeddle with it.
By the analogy of the 22nd section,
supra,perhaps the sons of Samuel Burke
should be preferred to the daughters. But
it does not appear that there is any contest between them. The real contest is
between them and Holder. They, we
think, or their representative, should receive the letters. Bair's Estate, 14 Lanc.
Bar 182; 7 P. & L. Dig. 11353.
Decree reversed, and Orphans' Court di.
rected to order the Register to revoke the
letters to Holder and grant letters to Helen
Burke, unless cause be shown why some
one else should receive them.

CHARLES JONES, TO USE OF WM.
TEALE vs. HORWITZ.
Mortgages-Promise of vendee of mortgagorto pay mortgage only binding
when in writing either dehors or in the
mortgage-Inthe absence of a bond the
mortgagor is not personally liable fbr
any deficiency-Bight of mortgagee to
ue in name of mortgagor.
STATEMENT OF"THE CASE.

Charles Jones executed to Teale a mortgage for $2,000, on a tract of land worth
$4,000, and subsequently conveyed the land
to Horwitz for $2,000 plus the mortgage,
which Horwitz promised Jones to pay.
No bond or other personal liability on
Jones' part toward Teale executed. He
had simply the mortgage. Teale sold the
land on a judgment sur mortgage obtaining only $1,800 of the debt, from the proceeds. He sues Horwitz for $200. Jones
files a disclaimer to the suit.
l. S. KAUFMAN for plaintiff.
The assignee of a mortgage may in an
action of assumpsit in Ehe name of the
mortgagor to his use recover fromn the
vendee of .the land who buys subject to
the mortgage. Thomas v. 4th St. M. E.
Church, 24 Pa. C. C. 642; Blood v. Levick
Co., 171 Pa. 328; Fehlinger v. Wood, et
at., 134 Pa. 517.
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Mortgagee may use name of mortgagor.
Lenox to use of Crawford v. Bowers, 160
Pa. 191.
J. W. JACOnS for defendant.
A mortgage without a bond creates no
personal liability.
Scott "v. Fields, 7
Watts 360.
Promise of vendee of land to pay a
mortgage isnot binding unless in writing.
Act June 12, 1878, P. L. 205; P. & L.
Dig. Col. 4063; Wonderlich v. Sadler, 189
Pa. 469; Blood v. Levick Co., 71 Pa. 328;
Merriman v. Moore, 90 Pa. 78; Davis'
Appeal, 89 Pa. 272, etc.
Vender must suffer loss before he can
maintain an action against vendee for
non-payment of mortgage. Moore's Appeal, 88 Pa. 450.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
This action is brought by Teale against
Horwitz to recover $200.
When Jones conveyed the land to
Horwitz there was a mortgage upon it,
due to Teale. The deed was not subject
to the mortgage, neither did it contain a
promise to pay. There was no special
circumstances here to raise a covenant to
pay this encumbrance and it, therefore.
amounts simply to an indemnity to the
vendor.
If Jones, at any time subsequently -to
the sale to Horwitz, had paid the mortgage, can there be any doubt that Horwitz
could be compelled in an action to reimburse Jones for such payment? McAbee
v. Cribbs, 194 Pa. 94.
We think this entirely changes the situation.
It has been held in Scott v.
Fields, 7 Watts 366, that an action of debt
will not lieupon a mortgage which contains
no express covenant to pay, and, therefore, creates no personal responsibility. To
hold Horwi'z personally liable would be
in strict conflict with the Act of June 12,
1878. P. & L. Col. 4063, which enacted
that, "a grantee of real estate which is
bound by a mortgage shall not be personally liable for payment of such mortgage,
unless he shall by an agreement in writing have expressly assumed a personal
liability therefor, or there shall be express
words in the deed of conveyance stating
that he is personally liable." No such
personal liability existed in this case,
either in writing or in the deed.
Suppose for a moment there was such a
personal liability, the question would be
whether Teale would have a right to
bringthe suit. The statute further enacts,

that the right to enforce such personal
liability shall not enure to any other person than the one with whom such agreement is made. Jones, being the person
with whom the agreement was made,
would be the right person to bring this
action, but in this case Jones files a disclaimer of the suit, thereby saying that he
takes no part in this action.
We. therefore, give judgment for the
defendant.
HE NNEKE, J.
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When Jones conveyed the land to
Horwitz, there was on it a mortgage for
$2,000, payable to Teale. Horwitz promised Jones to pay this mortgage. But
such a promise is not binding, unless it
was in writing. Act of June 12th, 1878,
P. L. 20.5; Fisher v. Reach, 202 Pa. 74;
Wonderlich v. Sadler, 189 Pa. 469. Tile
promise was not in writing.
Had there been in the deed to Horwitz,
words "statinu
that the grant is made on
condition of the grantee assuming such
personal liability," these words would
have had the same effect as a promise in
writing. Act of June 12, 1878, supra.
There were no such words in the deed.
There was then on Horwitz's part, no
liability to Jones, from the mere fact of
receiving the conveyance for a price which
was less, by the amount of the mortgage,
than the agreed value, nor from Horwitz's
oral promise to pay the mortgage.
Horwitz simply assumed the liability of
indemnifying Jones in case he should be
compelled to pay any part of the mortgage debt. But there existed "no bond
or other personal liability on Jones' part
towards Teale." Jones, therefore, could
not be compelled to pay, nor has he in
fact paid, any part of the mortgage. No
violation of Horwitz's duty to indemnify
him has occurred, or can occur. An action
by Jones himself, for himself, must fail.
But this action has been brought by
Teale, in the name of Jones. Teale could
sue in his own name, in no case, neither
on a written promise, by Horwitz to pay,
had there been such, nor on the implied
promise to indemnify. He could sue,
however, in the name of Jones. Cf. Wonderlich v. Sadler, 189 Pa. 469; Fisher v.
Reach, 202 Pa. 75.
But without an assignment of right of
Jones to him he could not use the name
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of Jones without Jones' consent. Not
only has Jones not authorized the use of
his name; but he has expressly disclaimed the suit of record. Teale can,
therefore, not maintain the action. Fisher
v. Reach, 202 Pa. 75. It follows that the
judgment of the learned court below must
be affirmed.
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RE CANTRELL'S ESTATE.

Orphans' Court sale-Time sale, with interest on purchase money-Apportionmdnt among creditors
STATEBMNT OF THE CASE.
Against Cantrell were judgments-one
for $2,000, one for $500, one for $275, one
for $375. The administrator obtained an
order to sell his land for the payment of
debts, which amounted to $4.000.
The terms of the sale allowed the purchaser to retain the money eighteen
months. The price was $2,000. Eighteen
months after the sale that sum, plus $180
interest, was paid by the purchaser.
Holmes, who owns the first judgment,
claims the $2,180. Teddloom, who owns
the $500, claimsthe$180. All the creditors
claim that they should share i, pro rata.
W. L. HOUCK for Holmes.
The creditors by judgment herein are to
be paid according to the priority in date of
their judgments. Girard v. McDermott,
5 W. &S. 128.
As a general rule, interest ceases on liens
divested by a sheriff's sale on the day of
the sale, and, in casesof an Orphans' Court
sale, on the day of confirmation. But,
like all general rules, it has its exceptions,
and the fact that the purchaser paid interest up to the time the auditor has allowed
it, takes the case out of the general rule.
Snider's Estate, 13 Phila, 560 ; Ramsey's
A ppeal, 4 Watts 72.
Where there is a time sale, carrying interest, as the installments of principal fall
due, the interest thereon should be divided
pro rata among the creditors, in proportion to the amount each was entitled to
receive out of the principal. Burkholder's
Appeal, 94 Pa. 522; Meal's Estate, 13 Phila.
558.
LOURIMER for administrator.
Upon the saleof an insolvent's real estate
by an administrator, in pursuance of all
order of the Orphans' Court, for the paymentof debts, the interestupon such claims
ceases from the time of the return and confirmation of Ithe sale, and will not be allowed for the time between confirmation
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and day of actual payment. Ramsey's
Appeal, 4 Watts 71; YZeatman's Appeal,
102 Pa. 297. Cited also, Breil's Appeal, 24
Pa. 511 ; Mason's Appeal, 8 Norris 402.

OPINION OF THE COURT.
In this case, the estate of Cantrell,
against which were judgments to the
anount of $4,000, was sold for $2,000. The
terms of the sale allowed tile purchaser
eighteen months within which to pay.
Upon payment, Holmes, who held the first
judgment for $2,000, claimed the interest
upon the purchase price, which amounted
to $180. The other judgment creditors
claim that the $180 should be divided
among them pro rata.
Holmes contends that he should receive
the $180; that he was, on the day of the
sale, entitled to the $2,000 absolutely, and
that as he has been compelled to wait
eighteen months for his money, he is entitled to the interest thereon.
The other creditors contend that, upon
the sale of real estate in pursuance of an
order of the court for the payment of debts,
the interest upon those debts ceases at the
return day of the order of sale.
In the argument before the auditor the
learned counsel referred to Ramsey's Appeal, 4 Watts 71. The rule as laid down in
that case is as follows: "A sale, under the
order of an Orphans' Court for the payment of debts, is a judicial sale, and has
been assimilated in several cases to a sale
made by the sheriff under process of a
court of common law. Now, it cannot
but be admitted that interest ceases from
the time of the return and confirmation of
a sheriff's sale; and I see no reason, as a
general principle, to make a distinction
between a sale by the sheriff and a sale
*
*
*
under order of the court. *
But there may be exceptions to this principle."
The court does not indicate any of the
exceptions, but the auditor is ofopinion this
is one, and that the rule as laid down in
Snider's Estate, 13 Phila. 560, governs this
case, in which the court held that "as a
general rule, interest ceases on liens divested by a sheriff's sale on the day of.
confirmation."
But, like all general rules,
it has its exceptions, and the fact that the
purchaser has paid interest up to the time
the auditor has- allowed it, takes the case
out of the general rule. When the sale
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was made, Holmes, the first judgment
creditor, was entitled to have his judgment
paid in full, and the other creditors were
entitled to have their judgments paid in
order out of the remaining funds. But
Holmes' judgment took all the assets of
the estate. To compel Holmes to wait
eighteen months for his money, and not to
allow him its earnings, is neither just nor
equitable.
Burkholder's Appeal, 94 Pa. 522, although not a parallel case, lays down the
rule which should control cases like the
one under discussion. In this case there
was an assignment for the benefit of creditors, an order from the court for a sale, a
sale and confirmation by the court. The
money in the hands of the auditor, and
the interest thereon, was held to belong to
the creditors, who were entitled to the
principal from which it accrued, and should
be distributed among them in proportion
to the amount of their respective distributive shares, and the length of time the
payment of these shares is respectively
postponed on account of the deferred installments of purchase money.
Applying these principles to the case in

hand, the auditor finds that Holmes is entitled to the $2,000, besides interest thereon for eighteen months,amounting to $180.
W. C. SMITH, Auditor.
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The interest of the Cantrell heirs in the
land was extinguished by the confirmation of the sale, and the debts, which were
a lien on it, were then divested. They
were then entitled to payment. The purchase money was$2,000, and it would have
all been consumed in the payment of the
first judgment. By some arrangement
with the purchaser, the payment was deferred, he agreeing to pay interest on the
money. The learned auditor has properly
held that the interest thus earned belonged
to the owner of the money which produced
it, and he was the owner of the first judgment. This is the doctrine, of Brownsville Deposit Bank's Appeal, 98 Pa. 347;
Burkholder's Appeal, 94 Pa. 522; Cf.
Cowden's Estate, 1 Pa. 267; Rice's Appeal, 79 Pa. 208; Wilhelm's Estate, 182
Pa. 281; Yeatman's Appeal, 102 Pa. 297.
Exceptions dismissed and report confirmed.

